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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

	25X1
2. Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in ''most hopeful'' new phase. (Page iii)	1
	25X1
4. Nepal: Plans of exiled leader in India to oust King Mahendra. (Page 111)	1
	25X1

25X1





28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

	Approved Release	se 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T009	A005700030001-5	
25X1	of improved relative ernment, has char hopeful" new phase besetting President UN's task would be He indicated that whe might shortly be mission for the postal Coquilhatville controlled poldville governments.	V	Kasavubu gov- m as in a "most cal difficulties observed that the nd Tshombé low." turn to the Congo, five-man com- ive; 's detention at nen for the Leo- arrest. Reports	γο X1 25X1
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		ing recent conversations in		25X1
05)/4	Nehru and Defense sistance leader Su	Minister Menon, Nepali Co barna Shumshere	25X1	OK
25X1	28 Apr 61	DAILY BRIEF	111	
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25X1 25X1	plans an "a Subarna, who Katmandu in D ent on the succ tain arms and turbed by the I Subarna of his	ll-out" effort against King Mahe has been in India since the King ecember, recognizes that his peess of his efforts during the conditional financing. Nehru, we king's autocratic actions, report "sympathy," but the degree of Subarna is at present unclear to be subarna to	endra in mid-June. g's takeover in plans are depend- oming month to ob- who has been dis- rtedly again assured support which New	_25X1
		SELECTED INTELLIGENCE		25X1
	(4	REPORTS AND ESTIMATES Available during the preceding		
25X1	25 April 1961. Soviet Sho	rt-Term Intentions Regarding 11-7-61. 25 April 1961.	Berlin and Germany.	0.00
	Possibility U.S.I.B. NIE	y of Soviet Nuclear Testing Dur 11-9-61. 25 April 1961.	ring the Moratorium. 25X1	25X1



The Situation in the Congo

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	ical fortunes. Ha
	vubu's ascendancy
	agreement between
	ha had manaissad a

[Hammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a "most hopeful" phase stems in part from his satisfaction at the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombe's failing political fortunes. Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasavubu's ascendancy over Tshombe will improve prospects for agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that he had received confirmation of the existence of a military agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces.

Hammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part intended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal returns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious conditions to permit Hammarskjold to remove him without seeming to bow to Congolese pressure.

The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombe's release from detention in Coquilhatville. He also asked the United States to make representations to Hammarskjold, urging that Tshombe's immediate release was required to prevent a coup in

Katanga by "more intractable elements."

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28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

	Nepali Congress Exiles Planning Stepped-up Campaign Against King	25X1
	Following Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's actions in December, he appeared willing to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while affording the exiles a haven in India	25X1
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25X1 25X1 25X1	Nehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he may be moving toward more direct support of the Nepali Congress party. at their meeting early in April, Nehru interposed no obstacles to Subarna's plans to promote non-violent agitation from India. suggests Nehru did not express disapproval of resort to violence as well. In addition, Krishna Menon gave no indication he would keep Subarna from importing arms, although Menon refused any direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party.	25X1 25X1
	There is little doubt that at this time only active Indian support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation, will so erode the King's position that the need for active Indian intervention will be obviated.	
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		25X1

28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5

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